Multimarket contacts with trade costs and distance cost

Keywords: Trade liberalization, collusion, territorial allocation, cartels, trade paradox, distance paradox, price competition, quantity competion, defection, cournot

Abstract

This paper presents a critical comparison of the four major papers on territorial allocation by Bernheim and Whinston, Lommerud and Sorgard, Schroder, and Bhattacharjea and Sinha. The paper adds a new dimension to the analysis as it also studies the impact of a change in distance on collusion and establishes the distance paradox which states that collusion is facilitated with a unit fall in the distance

References

Bernheim, D., Whinston, M. (1990). Multimarket contact and collusive behaviour. Rand J. Econ. 21(1), 1-26.

Bhattacharjea, A., Sinha, U. (2015). Multi-market collusion with territorial allocation. Int. J. Ind. Org. 41, 42-50.

Garg, T. K., & Mittal, P. (2021). Logistics networks: a sparse matrix application for solving the transshipment problem. Journal of Mathematical and Computational Science, 11(6), 7511–7522. https://doi.org/10.28919/jmcs/6654

Lommerud, K.E., Sorgard, L. (2001). Trade liberalization and cartel stability. Rev. Int. Econ. 9(2), 343-355.

Mittal, P. (2017). Time Series Analysis Using ARCH Models: A Case Analysis of Australian Stock Index. VEETHIKA-An International Interdisciplinary Research Journal, 3(1), 74–80. https://doi.org/10.48001/veethika.2017.03.01.007

Pinto, L.S., Roux, C., Thoni, C. (2015). Home Bias in Multimarket Cournot Games. http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/15.04.pdf , 1-24.

Schroder, Phillip J.H. (2007). Cartel stability and economic integration. Rev. Int. Econ. 15(2), 313-320.

Published
2022-06-30
How to Cite
Singh, R. (2022). Multimarket contacts with trade costs and distance cost. Journal of Business Management and Information Systems, 9(1), 1-4. https://doi.org/10.48001/jbmis.2022.0901001
Section
Articles