Multimarket contacts with trade costs and distance cost
Abstract
This paper presents a critical comparison of the four major papers on territorial allocation by Bernheim and Whinston, Lommerud and Sorgard, Schroder, and Bhattacharjea and Sinha. The paper adds a new dimension to the analysis as it also studies the impact of a change in distance on collusion and establishes the distance paradox which states that collusion is facilitated with a unit fall in the distance
References
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