Who Leads to Better Economic Growth? Dictatorship or Democracy?

SHASHI SHEKHAR; Udit P. S. Chauhan

doi:10.48001/ijhir.2022.08.01.004

SHASHI SHEKHAR Assistant Professor, Dyal Singh Evening College, University of Delhi, India
Udit P. S. Chauhan Comparative Public Policy, School of Social and Political Science University of Edinburgh, Scotland

DOI: https://doi.org/10.48001/ijhir.2022.08.01.004

Keywords: Autocracy, Benevolent Dictator, Dictatorship, Democracy, Economic growth, GDP, Immediate consumption, Path dependence

Abstract

Even though democracy is the most popular form of government globally based on the rights it provides its subjects, there has always been a debate about how dictatorships have witnessed remarkable economic growth. To understand this debate, the constantly changing political and social scenarios around the world should be considered as well because, with the dawn of globalisation, the policy domains of every country witnessed a response-oriented characteristic in its decision-making. The economist and author Dambisa Moyo is one of the several intellectuals in the field of economics who deemed dictators to lead the economy better. The observation she made was targeted at the countries with economies in the worst condition. She believed democracy to be the next priority once economic stability is achieved, but this rekindles the debate of who performs better at the economic front.

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